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KEEPING THINGS IN PROPORTION: 
THE JUDICIARY, EXECUTIVE ACTION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Geji yanyong niu dao2 
Eye for eye, tooth for tooth3 
Exitus acta probat 
Don't use a steam hammer to crack a nut5 
The principle of proportionality has a long and venerable history. Over 
2,500 years ago Confucius encapsulated the concept in his phrase "ge ji yan 
yong niu dao" (loosely, "let the means be proportionate to the object"). The 
principle has long been recognised in common law and civil law jurisdictions 
alike. The principle that a punishment should not be disproportionate to an 
offence can be traced back to section 10 of the Bill of Rights 1688 (proscribing 
excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments). In the 
criminal law it is a fundamental principle that the punishment should fit the 
crime. It is settled law that measures taken in self-defence must be proportionate 
to the danger posed. The proportionality principle is to be found outside the 
criminal law. It can arise in cases where a benefit is awarded but is not 
1 The author would like to especially thank Antony Shaw for his wise words, guidance , support, expertise, 
insight, enthusiasm and the many spirited hours spent di scussing the finer points of this paper. I have been 
privileged to have had had such a distinguished lecturer and practitioner to guide me. Without his 
assistance this paper would not have been possible. The author wishes to thank his mother, Nicola Varuhas, 
whose unconditional caring, support and encouragement has been invaluable. 
2 " Don't use a knife made for killing an ox to kill a chicken" Confucius (c55 l-479BC). 
3 Exodus 2 l :24. 
4 "The outcome justifies the deed" i.e. let the means justify the ends. 
5 This phrase has been adapted from the speech of Lord Diplock in R v Goldsmith [ 1983] 1 WLR 151 , l 55 
(HL) Lord Diplock. 
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considered sufficient compensation, or where a council grants or refuses to 
grant a planning permission. 6 
In Germany ("Verhtiltnismtij]igkeit")7, France ("Le Principe de 
Proportionalite")8 and other civil law jurisdictions the principle has long been 
recognised. 9 The European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice have both recognised the principle as one of fundamental importance. 10 
A case can be made that it is a "general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations". 11 
Until recently proportionality has not been seriously contemplated as a 
governing principle of administrative law in common law countries. Only in the 
last decade have the common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand, amongst others, begun to recognise the importance of proportionality 
in scrutinising executive action. 
The first step was to recognise proportionality as a guiding principle in 
assessing whether an executive decision was irrational. More recently, it is 
increasingly considered as a separate and discrete head of administrative review. 
In the United Kingdom today, proportionality now represents a separate ground 
of review. In New Zealand, proportionality has not yet been affirmed as a 
separate and discrete head of review, but that recognition is inevitable. 
6 For more historical background on proportionality in the common law see Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony 
Lester " Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor Dangerous" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) New 
Directions in Judicial Review (Stevens and Sons, London, 1988) 51. 
7 In Germany the principle of proportionality is termed " Verhaltnismal3igkeit", which literally translated 
means "relativity" . 
8 In France the principle of proportionality is termed " Le Principe de Proportionalite". See Guy Braibant 
" Le Principe de Proportionalite" ( I 974) 2 Melanges Walines 297 where Braibant considers the principle of 
proportionality to endorse the "rule of common sense". 
9 For more background information on proportionality in the laws of Europe see Nicholas Emiliou The 
Principle of Proportionality in European law: A Comparative Study (Kluwer Law International , London, 
1996). 
1° For more background information on proportionality in the laws of Europe see Emiliou, above. 
11 International Court of Justice Statute, art 38( I )(c) . 
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In this paper I consider the principle of proportionality specifically in the 
context of the judiciary, executive action and human rights. I make three main 
contentions. 
First, I contend that proportionality is a legitimate separate ground of 
review, and that it is required by international human rights treaties such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights ("the European Convention" or "the 
Convention") 12 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("the ICCPR") 13 . Much has been made of the fact that proportionality review is 
tantamount to merits review, however in my view it represents no more 
substantive review than the traditional grounds. I consider that it is the courts' 
constitutional duty to protect and promote fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. In discharging this duty the judiciary is compelled to adopt 
proportionality review in order to adequately safeguard those rights and 
freedoms. Judicial review of administrative action is ultimately a judicial 
creation designed to protect fundamental rights and freedoms from arbitrary 
interference by the executive, and as such it is for the judiciary to decide what is 
required to adequately protect and promote rights. 
Secondly, I contend that, in conducting proportionality review in cases 
where human rights are at stake, the judiciary should show no deference 
1 
t whatsoever to the executive. The doctrine and culture of deference posits that 
e intensity of review that should be provided by proportionality is to be 
watered down and weakened. Such approach does not afford human rights the 
degree of protection required in a free, open and democratic society. In 
advancing this contention, I do not suggest that the judiciary wage war on the 
executive; nor am I suggesting that the judiciary replace executive decisions 
with their own. I am simply contending that it is the courts' inescapable role to 
12 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( 4 November 
1950) 213 UNTS 221. 
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
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uphold and advance human rights standards, and in doing so they must ensure 
that executive actions do not disproportionately infringe upon fundamental 
rights and freedoms. In this context, the doctrine and culture of "deference" or 
"due deference", is directly inimical to the judiciary's constitutional duty to 
promote and protect fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Thirdly, I contend that the New Zealand courts must, and inevitably will 
adopt proportionality review. It is required by New Zealand's international 
obligations, especially under the ICCPR. A failure to adopt proportionality 
review would result in the breach of the State's international treaty duties. I also 
contend that proportionality review is statutorily mandated by the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, which contains an express proportionality requirement. 
Before continuing, it is important to clarify precisely what I mean by 
proportionality review in the context of executive action and human rights. 
Proportionality review in that context requires the judiciary to ensure that 
executive actions do not disproportionately infringe on individual's fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Drawing on existing principles, I suggest that the 
proportionality test contains three sub-principles: 
(1) Suitability: an administrative or legal power must be exercised in a way 
which is suitable to achieve the purpose intended and for which the power was 
conferred. This principle requires that the measures designed to meet the 
objective are rationally connected to it and appropriate; 
(2) Necessity: the exercise of the power must be necessary to achieve the 
relevant purpose. This principle requires that the least infringement possible be 
made on human rights. The objective must be sufficiently important to justify 
the limiting of the right; 
(3) Proportionality: the exercise of the power must not impose burdens or 
cause harm to other legitimate interests which are disproportionate to the object 
to be achieved. In the context of human rights this will mean the exercise of the 
5 
power must not impose infringements on an individual's human rights 
disproportionate to the object to be achieved (usually a public benefit). 
II EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The doctrine of proportionality review derives from the civil law 
jurisdictions of Europe, and is now enshrined in the European Convention. The 
doctrine of proportionality review provides for a more intense and farther 
reaching scrutiny of executive action than do the other traditional heads of 
review in the UK. 14 The degree and scope of review are greater under 
proportionality review. Because the UK had not until recently adopted 
proportionality review it was continually rebuffed at Strasbourg for not meeting 
the requirements of the Convention. It was this continual criticism from the 
European Court of Human Rights ("the ECHR") that led to the adoption of 
proportionality review in the UK. 
In this section I will first consider the ECHR's treatment of English style 
judicial review. I will then go on to discuss why the UK had to adopt 
proportionality review in order to fulfil its international obligations. 
A Substantive Guarantees 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR has proved to be the major driving force 
behind the adoption of proportionality review in the UK. Without the growing 
influence of the Convention in domestic law and domestic incorporation of the 
treaty in the Human Rights Act 1998 ("the HRA") it is questionable whether 
proportionality review would have evolved at all. The ECHR has continually 
found the traditional heads of review inadequate to fulfil the Convention 
14 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [200 I] 2 AC 11 S, paras 27-28 (HL) Lord Steyn; 
See also Takis Tridimas " Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard of 
Scrutiny" in Evelyn Ellis (ed) The Principle of Proportionality in the laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 1999) 65, 69 : " [P]roportionality is often perceived to be the most far-reaching ground of review, 
the most potent weapon in the arsenal of the public law judge". 
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requirements. It is these findings that have stirred the UK judiciary into 
adopting proportionality as a separate head of review. 
The adequacy of judicial review has been considered primarily under three 
provisions of the Convention: Articles 5( 4) (the right to habeas corpus), 6(1) 
(the right of access to the courts) and 13 (the right to an effective remedy). 
1 Article 5(4) 
Article 5(4) reads: 
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
This provision guarantees the right to habeas corpus - that every person 
detained, has the right to challenge the lawfulness of that detention. 15 
The ECHR has recognised that shortcomings in one procedure can be 
remedied by safeguards available in other procedures. 16 The courts can thus 
correct the unlawfulness of a detention imposed by the executive by providing 
an adequate remedy and control against such unlawfulness. It is in this context 
that the ECHR has considered the adequacy of judicial review as both a remedy 
and a safeguard against unlawful detention. 
The ECHR has not viewed judicial review favourably in this context. In 
Weeks v UK the Court agreed with the Commission's findings that the 
traditional heads of judicial review were too narrow in scope to provide the 
proceedings required by Article 5( 4) or remedy the inadequacy of executive 
15 For decisions concerning Article 5(4) regarding the UK see generally Curley v UK (200 l) 31 EHRR 14; 
Stafford v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 32; Brogan v UK ( 1988) 1 EHRR 117. 
16 Weeks v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 293, para 69 . 
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procedure. 17 The Court also agreed with the Commission's finding that the 
scope of control provided by judicial review was not wide enough to bear on the 
question of 'lawfulness' which required consideration of whether the detention 
was consistent with and justified by the objectives of the indeterminate sentence 
imposed on the applicant. 18 In Hussain v UK and Chahal v UK the Court again 
found that the scope of judicial review was too narrow to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 5(4). 19 The Com1 also criticised judicial review as being 
too w1certain a remedy.20 
It is clear from the decisions in Weeks , Hussain and Chahal that the UK 
courts had to adopt proportionality review in order to comply with the 
Convention requirements. A stand alone head of proportionality review would 
fulfil the Article 5( 4) criteria by broadening the scope of review and directly 
questioning the executive's justification for detention. The importance of such 
safeguards has been highlighted by the recent decision of Al-Nashif v Bulgaria 
where the ECHR found that such judicial controls cannot be dispensed with 
even where policy issues such as national security or terrorism are at stake.2 1 
2 Article 6(1) 
Article 6(1) provides: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations . .. , everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing . .. by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law. 
17 Weeks v UK, above, para 69. 
18 Weeks v UK, above, para 69; It should be noted that the Court has pointed out that the domestic courts 
cannot go so far as to substitute their decision for that of the decision-maker ' s : Weeks v UK, above, para 59 ; 
Hussain v UK ( 1996) 22 EHRR I, para 57. 
19 Hussain v UK, above, paras 57, 61 ; Chahal v UK ( 1996) 23 EHRR 413 , paras 124-133 . 
20 Hussain v UK, above, paras 56, 61. 
21 AI-Nashif v Bulgaria (2003) 36 EHRR 37, para 94; See also Chahal v UK, above, paras 130-133 . 
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This provision guarantees the right of access to the courts22, as part of the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6. Where an executive decision impacts on an 
individual ' s civil rights and obligations contrary to Article 6(1), the provision 
requires that that individual have the right to challenge the decision in front of a 
judicial body that has full jurisdiction and provides the guarantees of Article 
6(1).23 
The ECHR has been called upon several times to determine whether a UK 
court has satisfied the requirements of Article 6(1) as far as the scope of its 
jurisdiction is concerned. This is the context within which judicial review has 
been scrutinised under Article 6(1). 
In Kingsley v UK24 , which concerned the specialised area of gaming, the 
Court found that the traditional grounds of review were too narrow in scope to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1).25 The ECHR held that the domestic 
courts possessed inadequate jurisdiction, in the circumstances, when reviewing 
executive action.26 In W v UK the ECHR found that UK courts ' unwillingness to 
consider the merits of the decision in review proceedings was a violation of 
Article 6(1).27 The traditional heads of review were held to be too limited in 
scope in wardship proceedings. 28 This san1e conclusion was reached in the cases 
of O v UK29 , B v UK30 and R v UK. 31 
22 See generally Golder v UK ( 1975) I EHRR 525. 
23 Albert and l e Compte v Belgium (I 983) 5 EHRR 533, para 29. 
24 Kingsley v UK (2002) 35 EHRR I 0, paras 32-34. 
25 Where specialised areas of expertise are concerned the ECHR has at times found the traditional heads of 
review to be sufficient in scope to fulfil the requirements of Article 6( I) : Chapman v UK (200 I) 33 EHRR 
18, paras 121-125; Bryan v UK ( I 995) 21 EH RR 342, para 4 7; The Commission has once found judicial 
review to be of sufficient scope: Fayed v UK ( 1994) 18 EHRR 393, para 75. 
26 Kingsley v UK, above, para 32. 
27 W v UK ( I 987) I O EHRR 29, para 82; See also Cl v Italy (2002) 34 EHRR 41, para 40; See also Air 
Canada v UK ( I 995) 20 EHRR 150 where the applicants argued that the proportionality of the measures 
complained of could not be examined under the traditional heads of review. Because judicial review 
proceedings had not taken place the Court was unwilling to examine the appropriateness of review, but 
Judges Martens and Russo both believed that only fu II jurisdiction to consider the merits of the decision 
could provide the requisite safeguards. 
28 W v UK, above, para 82. 
29 0 v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 82. 
30 B v UK (1987)10 EHRR 87. 
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The deficiencies of a judicial review system which excluded a 
proportionality head of review was further highlighted in the case of Tinnelly v 
UK. 32 The ECHR found that the issuance of a security certificate by the 
Secretary of State disproportionately restricted the applicants' right to access to 
a court under 6(1).33 The ECHR further held that judicial review was inadequate 
to remedy or safeguard against such a violation. This was because the court did 
not have sight of all the documentation, and, more importantly, because the 
scope ofreview was too limited for the purposes of Article 6(1). There was thus 
a breach of Article 6(1).34 
Thus the unwillingness of the municipal courts to fully examine the merits 
of the decision has led to findings against the State. Pertinently, the traditional 
grounds of review have been unable to correct executive action which 
disproportionately infringes upon individual rights. A separate head of 
proportionality review has the aim of correcting such executive action. 
Proportionality review also subjects the executive decision to a heightened 
degree of scrutiny, considering the substance of the decision. It is thus likely 
that a separate head of proportionality review would serve to ensure that the 
Article 6(1) guarantee is not violated. 
3 Article 13 
Article 13 states: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
31 Rv UK(l987) 10 EHRR 74. 
32 Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and McE/duff v UK ( 1998) 27 EHRR 249. 
33 Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and McE/duff v UK, above, para 79. 
34 Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and McE/duffv UK, above, paras 72-79. 
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The ECHR has on several occasions considered the adequacy of judicial 
review as an effective remedy where individuals' rights are violated. Early in 
this line of case law the ECHR held the traditional grounds of review to be an 
effective remedy where rights had been violated by the executive.35 However in 
time judicial review can1e to be seen as wholly deficient. 
In Chahal v UK the ECHR considered the adequacy of the traditional 
grounds of judicial review in providing an effective remedy.36 The Court found 
that the narrow and limited nature of judicial review where national security 
was concerned was a violation of the Article 13 guarantee. 37 
In the landmark decision of Smith and Grady v UK the Court found that an 
executive policy banning homosexuals from the military breached the 
applicants ' right to respect for private life and could not be justified as 
necessary in a democratic society. 38 The Court also found a breach of Article 
13. The UK Court of Appeal had applied heightened scrutiny given the prima 
facie breach of fundamental rights but had not applied a proportionality standard 
of review. The Court considered the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and 
found: 39 
[T]he threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could find the 
Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively 
excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the 
interference with the applicants ' rights answered a pressing social need or was 
proportionate to the national security and public order claims pursued, principles 
35 Soering v UK ( I 989) 11 EHRR 439, paras 122-124; Vilvarajah v UK ( 1991) 14 EHRR 248 paras 123-
127. However in the case of Vilvarajah Judges Walsh and Russo both dissented holding that a national 
system which excluded the competence to make a decision on the merits could not meet the requirements 
of Article 13. These dissentingjudgments highlighted what would come to be seen as a major deficiency of 
English style judicial review. 
36 Chahal v UK ( 1996) 23 EHRR 413. 
37 Chahal v UK, above, paras 153-154. 
38 Smith and Grady v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493 ; See also Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 
548. 
39 Smith and Grady v UK, above, paras 129-139. 
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that lie at the heart of the Court's analysis of complaints under Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
After Smith it was clear that the UK courts had to adopt a separate head of 
proportionality review if the UK were to comply with Article 13. Indeed Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon believed that Wednesbury review had been given its 
"quietus" in Smith.40 If the UK courts were to be sure of fulfilling their Article 
13 obligations they would have to adopt proportionality review. This was 
highlighted by Smith and also the two more recent decisions in Hatton v UK and 
Al-Nashif v Bulgaria.41 In both these cases Article 13 had been violated because 
the domestic courts had not been able to consider whether an infringement on a 
Convention right had been proportionate or not.42 It is hard to see how the 
ECHR could make it clearer that proportionality had to be adopted as a separate 
head of review to avoid a major lacuna in municipal law. In short, a corpus of 
administrative law which did not include proportionality review would be in 
violation of the Convention. 
B Domestic Judiciaries and International Obligations 
Proportionality review had to be adopted in the UK in light of its 
international obligations (specifically the Convention). A lot of stigma has been 
attached to the adoption of proportionality review in the UK given that it merges 
on merits review. I would contend that this stigma is unwarranted. The adoption 
of proportionality review is mandated by the UK's international commitments. 
It is simply a requirement of the UK's international obligations under the 
Convention. 
40 R (Daly) v Secretary of State/or the Home Department [200 I] 2 AC 11 5, para 32 (HL) Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon; See also Lord Steyn's comments in Daly who saw Smith as crucial in coming to his conclusion 
that proportionality had to be adopted: R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, paras 
26-27 Lord Steyn (Lord Bingham ofCornhill, Lord Cooke ofThorndon, Lord Hutton, Lord Scott of 
Foscote concurring); See further Associalion of Brilish Civilian fnlernees - Far Eas/ Region v Secre/ary of 
State for Defence [2003] 3 WLR 80, paras 32-3 7 (CA) Dyson LJ for the Court. 
4 1 Hatton v UK (2002) 34 EHRR I; AI-Nashif v Bulgaria (2003) 36 EHRR 37. 
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It is important to highlight two basic yet important aspects of the 
international law of treaties. First, when a State enters a treaty, the obligations 
and duties undertaken by that State are binding upon every organ of the State -
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 43 It is often forgotten that the 
judiciary is bound by the State 's international undertakings; however this point 
is crucial when considering judge made law in light of treaty obligations. 44 
Secondly, it is well established in international law that the domestic legal 
system cannot be used as an excuse to justify the breach of international 
obligations.45 The International Court of Justice has on a number of occasions 
submitted advisory opinions concerning the final decisions of domestic courts 
and reinforcing the primacy of international obligations.46 
In light of these two tenets of international law it becomes clear that the 
judiciary is bound by international treaty obligations, and that there exists an 
obligation to develop the domestic law in conformity with such obligations and 
duties.47 A failure to do so on a specific occasion would represent a breach of 
international law. 48 
42 Hatton v UK, above, paras 115-116; Al-Nashifv Bulgaria, above, paras 137-138. 
43 Malcolm N Shaw International Law ( 4 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 806; See also 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) I 155 UNTS 331, art 26 which provides that 
"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". 
44 For example in the La Grand Case (Germany v US) the ICJ found that the US domestic courts' 
application of the ' procedural default rule ' in effect took away the right of the individual to question their 
conviction under the relevant convention: La Grand Case (Germany v US) (200 I) 40 I LM I 069, paras 79-
91 (ICJ). 
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, art 27 provides that "[a] 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty"; 
David John Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (5 ed, Sweet and Maxwell , London, 1998) 
662; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights ( 1999) 121 ILR 405 (ICJ); Alabama Claims Arbitration ( 1872) Moore 1 lnt Arb 495; 
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement of 26 June 1947 ( 1988) 82 ILR 225 (ICJ); Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case ( 1930) 5 lLR 4 
(PCIJ). 
46 La Grand Case (Germany v US) (2001) 40 ILM I 069 (ICJ); Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (Paraguay v USA) ( 1998) 37 ILM 810 (ICJ); Difference Relating to Immunity from 
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights ( 1999) 121 ILR 405 (ICJ). 
47 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) 35. 
48 Brownlie, above, 35. 
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Many of the Convention rights require a consideration of the 
proportionality of an infringement upon an individual right.49 The executive is 
bound to respect the requirements of these provisions and only infringe upon 
rights where it is proportionate to do so. But where the executive interference 
represents a disproportionate infringement the judiciary must have the power to 
remedy that infringement and safeguard against future infringements. The 
ECHR has on numerous occasions pointed out the need for judicial review to 
consider the proportionality of an executive infringement upon a right. 50 It is 
simply a requirement of the UK's international obligations that the municipal 
courts develop proportionality (even if it is merits review) as a separate head of 
review. 51 Where the judiciary fails to safeguard against such executive 
interferences they are not only failing in their constitutional duty to protect 
fundamental rights, they are also breaching the UK's treaty obligations. 
C The "Margin Of Appreciation" and Deference: Two Distinct Concepts 
Before continuing it is important to note the difference between the terms 
"deference" and "margin of appreciation". It could be suggested that because 
the ECHR grants the domestic government a degree of lee-way (by allowing a 
margin of appreciation), so too should the domestic courts accord the executive 
a degree of deference. This mistake could easily be made given both doctrines 
advocate some degree of discretion being left with the original decision-maker, 
untouched by the judicial body. It is a mistaken belief nonetheless. 
The Strasbourg Court has held that in determining whether an interference 
with a Convention right is proportionate a margin of appreciation would be 
49 For example European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 221, arts 8, 9, 10, 11. 
50 See Part ll A Substantive Guarantees. 
51 See the 'Bangalore Principles' adopted and developed by eminent jurists from across the globe (in a 
series of colloquiums) that prescribe that the judiciary should apply international human rights norms in 
interpreting constitutional rights and guarantees. See the series of publications: INTERRIGHTS and 
Commonwealth Secretariat Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms (The Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1988-1998) Volumes l-8. 
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given to the State authority. 52 This is based on the idea that the domestic 
government would be in a better position than an international body to 
determine the needs of its country. 53 A supranational authority like the ECHR is 
removed from the domestic circumstances of its member States and it is thus 
legitimate for certain questions to be left primarily to domestic authorities. 
However, it cannot follow from this that a domestic court should show 
deference to the executive in judicial review. The reason the ECHR has 
developed the margin of appreciation is because it is supranational court. The 
margin of appreciation has no relevance or application in the domestic sphere. 
Thus any argument favouring deference based on the margin of appreciation 
does not hold weight. 
III PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AND THE UK 
Proportionality review was eventually adopted in the UK, given the 
growing influence of European law which was typified by the domestic 
incorporation of the Convention into UK municipal law in 1998. In this section 
I consider the evolution of proportionality review in the UK jurisdiction. This 
section is aimed at giving a historical insight into the development of 
proportionality review. More importantly, though, this section is designed to 
highlight two hugely important trends in the UK judiciary' s attitudes in judicial 
review actions concerning human rights. The first trend that has evolved over 
time is the steadily growing level of scrutiny of executive action where human 
rights are concerned. The second trend to note is the judiciary's continuing 
awareness of not stepping on the executive's toes. Even though the judiciary are 
52 See for example Handyside v UK ( I 976) I EH RR 73 7; Buckley v UK ( 1996) 23 EHRR IOI. 
53 Paul Craig "The Courts, The Human Rights Act and Judicial Review" (200 I) 117 LQR 589, 589-590; 
Rabinder Singh "ls There a Role for the 'Margin of Appreciation' in National Law after the Human Rights 
Act" ( 1999) I EHRLR 15, 17; Lord Lester of Herne Hill and David Pannick (eds) Human Rights Law and 
Practice (Butterworths, London, 1999) 73-74; David Feldman "Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 
1998" in Evelyn Ellis (ed) The Principle of Proporlionality in the laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 1999) I 17, 124-126, 136-137; Sir John Laws "The Limitations of Human Rights" [ 1998] PL 254, 
254. 
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showing more anxious scrutiny where human rights are involved they continue 
to show deference to the executive. 
A Pre-Human Rights Act 
Proportionality was first postulated as a separate head of review in the UK 
in 1985 by Lord Diplock in CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service, noting that 
the principle had been recognised in the administrative law of several European 
nations. 54 However from this time until the domestic incorporation of the 
Convention the doctrine of due deference impeded the adoption of 
proportionality review. 
In Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department the concept of a 
separate head of proportionality review was expressly rejected. 55 Both Lord 
Bridge of Harwich and Lord Roskill believed that to allow proportionality 
review would involve the courts substituting their own decision for that of the 
executive.56 Their Lordships were unwilling to potentially usurp their power and 
infringe upon the executive sphere, preferring instead to defer to the executive. 57 
Their Lordships were however willing to provide greater scrutiny where human 
rights were at stake, and require justification for any infringement upon a 
fundamental right. 58 
This approach of heightened scrutiny under the irrationality head of 
review has been adopted and developed in several cases. 59 The approach is 
54 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [ 1985] AC 3 74,410 (HL) Lord Dip lock. 
55 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 1991] I All ER 720, 735 (H L) Lord Ackner. 
56 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, 723 Lord Bridge of Harwich; Brind v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, 725 Lord Roskill. 
57 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, 723 Lord Bridge of Harwich (Lord Roskill 
concurring). 
58 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, 723 Lord Bridge of Harwich (Lord Roskill 
concurring). 
59 See for example Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 1987] AC 514, 531 (HL) 
Lord Bridge of Harwich: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte launder [ 1997] 3 All 
ER 961, 989 (HL) Lord Hope of Craighead; R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A [ 1999] 4 All ER 
860, 872 (CA) Lord Woolf MR. 
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epitomised by Sir Thomas Bingham MR's judgment in R v Ministry of Defence, 
ex pa rte Smith. 60 The Master of the Rolls found that the more substantial the 
interference with human rights, the more justification the court would require in 
order to hold the decision reasonable, and the greater the policy content of the 
decision the less likely it will be held unreasonable. 61 However, while this 
approach purported to show a greater intensity of review where human rights 
were involved, the courts still preferred to allow a wide area of deference where 
the decision had some policy element.62 The courts were failing to give 
adequate protection to fundamental rights, in practice. 
It is clear that before the HRA came into force the courts had been 
unwilling to adopt proportionality review for fear of usurping their function in 
the separation of powers. Although the courts were purporting to subject 
executive action which infringed on human rights to "anxious scrutiny"63 , in 
reality this was not the case. The courts continued to apportion significant 
deference to the executive. There is a clear dichotomy here in that where the 
courts show deference to the executive, this impedes their ability to afford 
adequate protection to human rights. This dichotomy was being reconciled in 
favour of the executive.64 Deference continued to stand in the way of the 
judiciary affording full protection to fundan1ental rights. This is further 
60 R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [ 1996] I All ER 257 (CA). 
6 1 R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, above, 263-265 Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 
62 See for example R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline [ I 999] 4 All ER 80 I , 844 (HL) 
Lord Hope of Craighead: where Lord Hope of Craighead holds that more deference should be shown 
"where the convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms 
which are unqualified" and "where the issues involve questions of social or economic policy, much less so 
where the rights are of high constitutional importance or are of a kind where the courts are especially well 
placed to assess the need for protection."; See also R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, above, 263-265 
Sir Thomas Bingham MR; R v lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A, above, 870-87 I Lord Woolf MR; 
Bugdaycay v Secreta1y of State for the Home Department, above, 522-523 Lord Bridge of Harwich. 
63 This term was coined by Lord Hope of Craighead: R v Secretmy of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte launder [1997] 3 All ER 961,989 (HL) Lord Hope ofCraighead. 
64 This is evidenced by the fact that all of the cases mentioned which apply the "anxious scrutiny" test were 
decided in favour of the executive: Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 1991] I All ER 
720 (HL); Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514 (HL); R v Secretary of 
Stale for the Home Department, ex par le launder [ 1997] 3 All ER 961 (HL ); R v Lord Saville of 
Newdigate, ex parte A [ 1999] 4 All ER 860 (CA); R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [ 1996] I All ER 
257 (CA); R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebe/ine [ I 999] 4 All ER 80 I (HL). 
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evidenced by the fact that the UK courts were continually being rebuffed at 
Strasbourg. 65 
B Post-Human Rights Act 
Following the passage of the HRA through Parliament which incorporated 
the Convention as part of UK municipal law66, proportionality was rapidly 
adopted as a separate head of review. In effect the UK courts had to adopt the 
proportionality head of review given that Convention rights were now directly 
enforceable within the UKjurisdiction. 
The first step towards proportionality review came in R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Amjad Mahmood. 67 The case 
concerned the review of a decision made by the Secretary of State regarding an 
asylum seeker who had sought leave to remain in the UK. Although the HRA 
had not been enacted at the time of the decision the Court of Appeal proceeded 
as if the Act had been in force. The Master of the Rolls described the test to be 
1. d 68 app 1e : 
[W]hen anxiously scrutinising an executive decision that interferes with human 
rights, the court will ask the question , applying an objective test, whether the 
decision-maker could reasonably have concluded that the interference was 
necessary to achieve one or more of the legitimate aims recognised by the 
Convention. 
This was the first time the courts had directly scrutinised the necessity of 
the executive's decision. It should be noted that this major shift in judicial 
65 See Part II A Substantive Guarantees. 
66 See the Human Rights Act l 998 (UK) Long Title: "An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights ... ". 
67 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amjad Mahmood [200 l] HRLR 14 (CA). 
68 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amjad Mahmood, above, para 40 Lord Phillips 
of Worth Matravers MR (emphasis added); It is important to note that the Court was still quick to point out 
that the judiciary should not usurp its role: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amjad 
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attitude directly coincides with the domestic incorporation of the Convention 
into UK municipal law. The UK judiciary were aware that their decisions and 
reasoning regarding Convention rights were open to ECHR scrutiny. The courts 
could no longer excuse their decisions on the basis that the Convention was not 
part of domestic law. 
In the two key decisions of R(Alconbury Ltd) v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions69 and especially R(Daly) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department70 proportionality review began to gain 
acceptance as a separate ground of review. 
In Alconbury Lord Slynn of Hadley openly embraced the concept of 
proportionality as a separate ground of review. 71 His Lordship believed that the 
HRA made it necessary for the courts to ask whether the executive action was 
compatible with Convention rights. 72 His Lordship believed that that mqmry 
would often require the principle of proportionality to be satisfied. 73 
In Daly Lord Steyn, whose comments were unanimously endorsed, 
expressly affirmed proportionality as a separate head of review. 74 While 
admitting that there will inevitably be some overlap with the other heads of 
review his Lordship maintained that the intensity of review under 
proportionality review is somewhat greater than under the traditional heads. 75 
Mahmood, above, paras 29, 33 Laws LJ; See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Amjad Mahmood, above, para 38 Lord Philips of Worth Matravers MR. 
69 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secreta,y of State/or the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
[200 I] 2 WLR 1389 (HL). 
70 R (Daly) vSecretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 115 (HL). 
71 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
above, para 51 Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
72 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
above, para 51 Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
73 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
above, para 51 Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
74 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [200 I] 2 AC 115, paras 24-28 (HL) Lord Steyn 
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Cooke ofThorndon, Lord Hutton, Lord Scott of Foscote concurring). 
75 R (Daly) v Secretary of State/or the Home Department, above, para 27 Lord Steyn. 
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Drawing on the differences between proportionality and the traditional heads 76, 
European jurisprudence77 and constitutional case law78 Lord Steyn states that "it 
is ... important that cases involving convention rights must be analysed in the 
correct way". 79 
The dicta in Alconbury8° and Daly8' are a recognition that fundamental 
rights are to be subjected to intense scrutiny under the proportionality head of 
review. The signal being sent was that executive officers could no longer hide 
behind the veil of deference. However to have had such faith would be to have 
held a hollow hope. The line of case law since the landmark decision in Daly 
does not cast the judiciary as valiant defenders of human rights, but as meek and 
subservient partners in the separation of powers. 
In R v BBC, ex parte Prolife Alliance Lord Hoffman made it forcefully 
clear that the judiciary was not willing to infringe upon the executive scope of 
activity. Lord Hoffman commented that in a society based upon the rule of law 
and the separation of powers it is necessary to decide the legal limits of those 
powers. 82 He made the point that it will sometimes fall to the judiciary to define 
the limits of their own decision-making power. 83 But when these limits are 
76 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, para 27 Lord Steyn: His Lordship 
highlights three concrete differences between proportionality review and the other heads. The first is that 
"the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision 
maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions" . Secondly, 
the proportionality head of review may go further than the traditional heads " inasmuch as it may require 
attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations" . And third ly, Lord 
Steyn believed the "anxious scrutiny" test developed by the courts may not go far enough in securing the 
protection of human rights. 
77 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, para 27 Lord Steyn: His Lordship places 
reliance on the ECHR case of Smith and Grady v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493 . 
78 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, para 27 Lord Steyn: His Lordship draws 
the principle of proportionality from the constitutional case of De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands, and Housing [ 1999] AC 69 (PC). 
79 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, para 28 Lord Steyn . 
80 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
[200 I] 2 WLR 1389 (HL). 
81 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above. 
82 R v BBC, ex parte Prolife Alliance [2003] UKHL 23, para 75 (HL) Lord Hoffman. 
83 R v BBC, ex parte Prolife Alliance, above, para 76 Lord Hoffman. 
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drawn it is not out of courtesy or deference, but upon principles of law. 84 So that 
when a court decides that a decision is within the proper competence of the 
legislature or the executive they are not being courteous or showing deference, 
they are abiding legal limits. 85 While this analysis appears relatively coherent, 
Lord Hoffman draws the limits of the judiciary's responsibilities far too 
narrowly, and those of the executive far too widely. Lord Hoffman affords the 
executive far too much lee-way. His Lordship fails to recognise the judiciary's 
wider constitutional role as guardians and promoters of human rights. If human 
rights are truly the court's responsibility then any decision that purports to 
infringe on fundamental rights should fall within the realm of the judiciary, 
whether the decisions have policy elements or not. By buying into the 
'deference industry' Lord Hoffman is failing to apportion fundamental rights 
and freedoms the requisite protection. 
This avid and unquestioning reliance upon deference has found weight in 
several other judgements of the UK courts. 86 For example in Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v Rehman their Lordships were of the opinion that 
deference should be accorded not only because of the superior expertise and 
access to special information the executive possesses, but also because their 
decisions are legitimised by the fact that them are elected officials. 87 And in A, 
X, Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department Lord Woolf CJ (apparently 
contravening the European precedents of Chaha/88 and Al-Nashif9) said 
"[ d]ecisions as to what is required in the interest of national security are self-
evidently within the category of decisions in relation to which the court is 
84 R v BBC, ex parte Prolife Alliance, above, para 76 Lord Hoffman. 
85 R v BBC, ex parte Prolife Alliance, above, para 76 Lord Hoffman . 
86 R (lsiko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [200 I] HRLR 15, para 30 (CA) Schiemann LJ; R 
v Lambert [200 I] 3 WLR 206, 270-273 (HL) Lord Hutton; R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [200 I] EWCA Civ 1698, para 23 (CA) Lord Woolf CJ; R (Samaroo) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [200 I] EWCA Civ 1139 (CA); R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] QB 1391, paras 71-79 (CA) Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR for the Court; Brown 
vStott [2001] 2 WLR 817, 834-835 (PC) Lord Bingham ofCornhill. 
87 Secreta,y of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 4 7, para 62 (HL) Lord Hoffman. 
88 Chahal v UK ( 1996) 23 EHRR 413. 
89 Al-Nashif v Bulgaria (2003) 36 EHRR 37. 
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required to show considerable deference to the Secretary of State because he is 
better qualified to make an assessment as to what action is called for".90 And in 
Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue Lord 
Woolf CJ again preferred to defer to an elected br eh of government:91 
We are satisfied, that notwithstanding its mandatory terms, section 21 ( 4) of the 
1988 [Housing] Act does not conflict with the defendant's right to family life . 
Section 2 I ( 4) is certainly necessary in a democratic society in so far as there must 
be a procedure for recovering possession of property at the end of a tenancy. The 
question is whether the restricted power of the court is legitimate and 
proportionate. This is the area of policy where the court should defer to the 
decision of Parliament. We have come to the conclusion that there was no 
contravention of Article 8 or of Article 6. 
It is laughable for the courts to purport to use the proportionality test, only 
to circumvent it where there is the merest trace of policy.92 This ' deference 
culture' effectively denies individuals the full enjoyment of their Convention 
rights where the executive action contains some policy content. Basically, if an 
executive action contains some trace of policy, the court will refuse to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This is a heretical departure from principle 
and is particularly peculiar in light of the fact that the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
is replete with judgments challenging executive policy decisions.93 
Even now that proportionality review has been established as a head of 
review, the British judiciary continue to defer to the executive. 94 The UK 
90 A, X, Yv Secrelary ofSLaLefor Lhe Home DeparLmenL [2003] HRLR 3, para 40 (CA) Lord Woolf CJ . 
9 1 Poplar Housing & Regeneralion Communily Associalion lld v Donoghue [200 I] EWCA Civ 595 , para 
72 (CA) Lord Woolf CJ . 
92 This approach leads to absurd consequences. See for example Philip Plowden and Kevin Kerrigan 
Advocacy and Human Righls: Using Lhe Convenlion in Courts and Tribunals (Cavendish, London, 2002) 
127-130, where the authors basically advise human rights advocates to give up on the proportionality test 
where a policy area is involved . 
93 See for example Kingsley v UK (2002) 35 EHRR I 0; Smilh and Grady v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493; 
Halton v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 1; Al-Nashif v Bulgaria (2003) 36 EHRR 37; Chahal v UK ( 1996) 23 EHRR 
413. For further examples see Part 11 A SubsLantive Guarantees. 
94 See generally Nicholas Blake " Importing Proportionality: Clarification or Confusion" (2002) I EHRLR 
19; Richard A Edwards "Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act" 65 MLR 859 ; Paul Craig "The 
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judiciary are still reluctant to fully embrace a concept that verges upon merits 
review. The courts appear anxious and cautious when applying the 
proportionality test - tiptoeing around the executive. 
This pattern of deference means that the intensity of review that should be 
provided by the proportionality test is watered down and weakened. There is no 
point in pledging to defend fundan1ental rights through a more exacting ground 
of review only to blunt the test by deferring to the executive. In many ways the 
judicia~ op~ir constitutional duty to protect fundamental 
rights and freedoms. It is my contention (as I will elaborate upon in the next 
section) that the judiciary should not be so hesitant in their application of 
proportionality review and should refrain from showing such deference when 
dealing with human rights issues. Not only would such a watered down test 
meet criticism at Strasbourg, but it does not afford human rights the protection 
required in a free and democratic society. 
IV PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: THE JUDICIARY, EXECUTIVE ACTION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A The Issues 
The courts in the UK, as seen above, have been slow to adopt 
proportionality as a separate head of review. Indeed it took roughly 15 years for 
the doctrine to develop as a fully fledged ground of review since Lord Diplock 
first mentioned the possibility.95 It was indeed questionable after the decision in 
ex parte Brind which explicitly rejected the idea whether the principle would 
develop at all. 96 But with the growing influence of European jurisprudence and 
Courts, The Human Rights Act and Judicial Review" (200 I) 117 LQR 589; Jeffrey Jowell " Due Deference 
under the Human Rights Act" in Jonathan Cooper and Jeffrey Jowell (eds) Delivering Rights? How the 
Human Rights Act is Working and for Whom (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003). 
95 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410 (HL) Lord Diplock. 
96 Brindv Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] I All ER 940 (HL). 
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the influence of the landmark HRA proportionality now represents a separate 
ground of review. 
The reason for the tentative approach by the judiciary, in my view, rests in 
the doctrine of due deference. Judges have been reluctant to cross the line and 
impinge upon the executive sphere, being more willing to show deference to 
executive decision making, even where fundamental rights are at stake. 97 The 
courts before they adopted a proportionality approach were increasingly aware 
of the importance of human rights, and showed greater scrutiny where such 
rights were at stake but always stopped short of criticising the actual decision.98 
Even now with the proportionality head of review affirmed in UK law judges 
continue to show great deference to the executive particularly in cases where 
public expenditure is involved and where the issue at stake involves a large 
policy element, such as national security. 99 
There are several reasons why judges are so willing to defer to the 
executive. Judges defer to the executive on the basis that the executive is better 
placed to make such assessments and have greater expertise in the area of policy 
formulation. 100 They also defer on the ground that it is not the role of the judge 
to interfere in matters which are clearly in the executive realm such as national 
security policy or where the allocation of scarce resources is concerned. 101 It is 
also clear that judges continue to prefer a cautious approach to the area of 
administrative law in general. Traditionally judicial review has been seen as a 
process whereby the judiciary scrutinises the 'form ' rather than the 'substance' 
of executive acts. The courts have traditionally steered clear of scrutinising the 
97 See for examp le R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebe/ine [ I 999] 4 All ER 80 I (H L); R v 
BBC, ex parte Prolife Alliance [2003] UKHL 23 (HL). 
98 See the ECHR analysis in Smith and Grady v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493. 
99 See for example Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [200 I] UKHL 4 7 (HL). 
'
00 See for example A, X, Yv Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] HRLR 3 (CA); 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, above. 
101 See for example R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [ 1996] I All ER 257 (CA); Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [ I 985] AC 374 (HL); R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2002] QB 1391 (CA); R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International 
Trader's Ferry Ltd [ I 999] 2 AC 418 (I-IL). 
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substance of an executive decision ('merits ' review), but instead limit 
themselves to considering the process by which the decision was made. 102 Some 
believe proportionality to be verging on substantive review which is clear in the 
hesitant way in which the courts conduct review. 103 
In my view these reasons are spurious and otiose. The point has already 
been made above that the judiciary must look to the substance of the decision in 
order to fulfil their international obligations and duties. 104 In this section I will 
make three additional and equally important points. First, proportionality shows 
no less an infringement on the executive sphere than the traditional heads of 
review. Secondly, it is the role of the judiciary to affirmatively protect and 
promote human rights. Thirdly, the courts power of judicial review derives from 
the common law and the rule of law and it is thus their inescapable role to set 
the limits of review. 
It is one thing to say judges should not substitute their decisions for that of 
the executive, but it is quite another to say that deference should be shown to 
executive decisions that infringe upon human rights. In proportionality review 
the judges are not re-making the executive decision, they are simply ensuring 
that the executive decision does not disproportionately infringe upon 
fundamental rights. It is my contention that deference should not play a role 
where human rights are at stake. It is my view that it is the courts ' role to 
uphold human rights, and by virtue of that role there is no need to defer to the 
executive where human rights are at stake. The points I make below advocate 
this view and defend proportionality as a stand alone head of review. 
102 See for example Chief Constable of North Wales v Evans [ 1982] I WLR 1155 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
103 See for example the speeches of Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Roskill in Brind v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [ 1991] I All ER 940 (I-IL). 
104 See Part II European Convention on Human Rights. 
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B Proportionality - No More Substantive Review than the Traditional Heads of Review 
It is claimed that the proportionality head of review verges on substantive 
review of executive decisions and that the judiciary is usurping its power in 
taking such an approach. I would contend that even if this is the case, 
proportionality review represents no more an infringement on the executive 
branch than the traditional grounds of review. 
Take for example an inquiry into whether a decision-maker took into 
account irrelevant considerations. It would be impossible for a judge to conduct 
this exercise without looking at the actual substance of the decision, and 
scrutinising the content of the decision. For a judge to consider whether a 
decision-maker took into account irrelevant considerations he or she must look 
to the actual considerations. He or she must look at the way the decision-maker 
prioritised those considerations, and how they relate to the final decision. The 
judge must decide what is irrelevant and what is relevant. This form of review 
requires a consideration of the substance of the decision. 
In considering the rationality of the executive officer' s decision the court 
will be challenging the substance of official decisions. 105 Even where a judge 
applies the narrow Wednesbury test they would need to consider the merits of 
the decision. Under the Wednesbury test a decision can be voided on the ground 
that it was a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could 
have reached it. 106 In such a case the judge is called upon to consider the 
reasonableness of the decision - surely this must entail scrutiny of the 
substantive decision and not simply the procedure gone through. A judgment 
105 Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony Lester " Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative 
Law" [ 1987] PL 368, 369. 
106 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbwy Corporation [ I 948] I KB 223, 228-230 (CA) 
Lord Greene MR. 
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whether a decision is reasonable or not entails a challenge by the judiciary as to 
the substance of an executive decision. 107 The nebulous nature of the test will 
certainly encourage suspicion that prejudice or policy considerations may lie 
behind ajudgement. 108 
It can also be argued that judges are engaging in substantive review when 
they consider the legality of a decision. This analysis would entail a 
consideration of whether the executive officer' s decision fell outside the four 
comers of the parent Act. 109 To answer this question, a judge must again look to 
the substance of the decision in determining whether the decision-maker 
usurped their statute granted power. Even where a judge considers the 
impartiality of the decision-maker they may be called upon to scrutinise the 
substance of the decision to deduce whether bias swayed the decision-maker. 
I don't believe these observations are ground-breaking nor do I think that 
they are difficult observations to make. However they are important 
observations when defending proportionality review from those who claim it to 
be merits review. If proportionality is merits review, then so too are the 
traditional heads of review, as they all involve a similar legal analysis. When 
conducting proportionality review a judge must consider the suitability of the 
exercise of the executive power, whether the exercise of the power was 
necessary and whether the power was exercised proportionately. Surely these 
questions entail a legal analysis analogous to that carried out when considering 
the irrationality and illegality heads of review. When the courts inquire as to 
whether a Minister brought a rational mind to bear on a question the courts are 
imposing a judge-made standard on the decision-maker. To propose a more 
exacting standard under proportionality-type review is no different in principle. 
A proportionality-type approach represents no more an usurpation of 
107 Jowell and Lester, above, 369. 
108 Jowell and Lester, above, 372. 
109 Jowell and Lester, above, 369. 
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constitutional propriety than the traditional Wednesbury ground. 110 It simply 
means that when human rights are at stake the courts will be more exacting in 
their scrutiny of executive action and require sufficient justification for the 
infringement on the right. 
Proportionality review does not entail the courts striking down executive 
decisions and replacing the executive decision with their own. It does not entail 
the courts wielding executive powers. Judges are not being set free to second-
guess administrators on the merits of their policies. 111 Proportionality review 
simply involves the courts checking executive power, as do the other heads of 
review. It is one thing to consider the merits of a decision, and quite another to 
make the decision. 112 
In fact it has been suggested that requiring the courts to substantiate their 
decisions in terms of suitability, necessity and proportionality actually reduces 
the capacity for judges to deliver judgements on the merits of the case, which is 
a potential for abuse in an amorphous test like the Wednesbury test. 11 3 The 
establislunent of principles like proportionality steer the courts away from 
policy or personal preference. 114 As Sedley LJ has endorsed, the more 
principled approach involved in proportionality review promotes certainty and 
transparency in decision-making. 11 5 
110 Sir John Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights" [ 1993] PL 59, 69. 
111 Jeffrey Jowell " Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" [2000] PL 671, 681. 
112 Gareth Wong "Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the Objections to Proportionality" 
[2000] PL 92, I 02 . 
113 Wong, above, I 04. 
114 Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony Lester " Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative 
Law" [ 1987] PL 368,381; Paul Craig "U nreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law" in Evelyn Ellis 
(ed) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 85, 99-100. 
11 5 London Regional Transport v The Mayor of London [200 I] EWCA Civ 1491 , para 57-58 (CA) Sedley 
LJ: "[Proportionality) replaces an elastic concept with which political scientists are more at home than 
lawyers with a structured inquiry ... It seems to me, with great respect, that this now well established 
approach furnishes a more certain guide for people and their lawyers than the test of the reasonable 
recipient's conscience. While the latter has the imprimatur of high authority, I can understand how difficult 
it is to give useful advice on the basis of it. One recipient may lose sleep a lot more readily than another 
over whether to make a disclosure, without either of them having to be considered unreasonable. If the test 
is whether the recipient ought to be losing sleep, the imaginary individual will be for practical purposes a 
judicial stalking-horse and the judgment more nearly an exercise of discretion and correspondingly less 
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C The Role of the Judge 
What is the role of a judge? This an extremely wide and far reaching 
question, indeed this subject could occupy an entire volume of legal texts. In 
this essay I cannot comprehensively answer this question, nor come close. 
However I do wish to discuss the wider role of the judiciary in a free and 
democratic society. 
It is first important to consider the question of what a real democracy 
entails. In New Zealand (as in the UK) we have a representative democracy. We 
have free, fair and regular elections. The party or coalition of parties that have 
the majority in the House govern, having gained their mandate from the 'demos' 
(the people). So, therefore, we have a free and democratic society. But do we? 
The people have expressed their will and the government and legislature are 
given their legitimacy by the fact they were democratically elected. However 
there is an inherent problem with propounding that this represents real 
democracy. Without some other check the interests of all peoples are not 
represented. Only the interests of the majority are safeguarded. This is formal 
democracy but it is not substantive democracy. 116 Substantive democracy not 
only entails the functioning of a representative democratic process but also the 
supremacy and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 117 Ultimate 
sovereignty in every civilised constitution, it has been said, rests not with those 
who wield governmental power, but in the conditions under which they are 
permitted to do so. 118 This is necessary because the minority in a representative 
democratic regime have no protection otherwise. They are vulnerable to 
excesses and abuses of power by the majority. Thus we not only require a 
predictable. So for my part I find it more helpful today to postulate a recipient who, being reasonable, runs 
through the proportionality checklist in order to anticipate what a court is likely to decide, and who adjusts 
his or her conscience and conduct accordingly". 
116 Aharon Barak "The Supreme Court 200 I Term Forward: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy" (200 I) 116 Harv L Rev 19, 38-39; See also Rabinder Singh The Future of Human 
Rights in the United Kingdom (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997) 44-48. 
117 Barak, above, 39. 
118 Sir John Laws "Law and Democracy" [ 1995] PL 72 , 92 . 
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119 
democratic process but also the protection of fundamental values and rights of 
all people. As Sir John Laws says, democratic power requires limits: 119 
As a matter of fundamental principle, it is my opinion that the survival and 
flourishing of a democracy in which basic rights . . . are not only respected but 
enshrined requires that those who exercise democratic, political power must have 
limits set to what they may do: limits which they are not allowed to overstep. If 
this is right, it is a function of democratic power itself that it not be absolute . 
The logical question which follows is "who will protect these rights?" 
When a tension develops between the views of the majority and individual 
rights a balance will need to be struck. 120 The legislature and executive will 
protect the rights of the majority, as they represent their interests. However, 
without some other check there exists the potential for the minority to be 
subjected to arbitrary power and for individual rights to be infringed upon. 
There exists no body or entity to protect the rights of the minority. It must, 
therefore, fall to the judiciary to perform this function. They are the independent 
and impartial arm of government. They are free from the influences of the 
majority, and thus they are the appropriate entity to protect such fundamental 
rights. They owe allegiance to nothing except their constitutional duty of 
reaching through reasoned debate the best attainable judgements in accordance 
with justice and law. 121 We have seen above that judges are willing to defer to 
the executive when the issue at stake is regarded to be beyond their expertise. 
But this is the wrong approach. When human rights are involved it is always 
within the expertise of the judiciary as they are the entity charged with 
protecting these rights, indeed they are the only body capable of doing so. And 
it is outside the executive' s jurisdiction to disproportionately infringe on human 
rights. The very fact that the executive are elected and represent the majority is 
the very reason why the courts should intervene when they impinge on 
fundamental rights. The judiciary should not be seen as a junior partner in the 
Laws, above, 81. 
120 Lord Steyn " Democracy Through Law" (2002) 6 EHRLR 723 , 724. 
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tripartite relationship with the other branches. They are equal partners and as 
such should not bow to either of the other two branches. 
The conclusion to draw from this discussion is that the judiciary has a 
wider constitutional role. They are not only there to decide the dispute before 
them, but also to uphold the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of all 
persons. 122 They must take on this role for a truly free and democratic society to 
exist: "A people's aspiration to democracy and the imperative of individual 
freedoms go hand in hand". 123 Sir Robin Cooke, as he then was, commented 
that "the courts have a constitutional role and it is their duty to fulfil it". 124 In 
the same article he also stated that "[o]ne may have to accept that working out 
truly fundamental rights and duties is ultimately an inescapable judicial 
responsibility". 125 When human rights are involved the judiciary must actively 
and anxiously protect them, regardless of questions regarding the separation of 
powers or deference. If human rights are at stake then the case is unquestionably 
within the realm of the judiciary's jusiticiability. In our Westminster system the 
courts have dictated that Parliament be sovereign. The executive has no such 
status, and must be open to the most anxious scrutiny. 126 
D Judicial Review -A Common Law Right 
In order to answer whether it is legitimate for the courts to arm themselves 
with proportionality review it is integral to consider where the courts draw their 
power to judicially review executive action. Indeed this is a much debated topic. 
There are two sides to the debate. 
12 1 Lord Steyn, above, 724. 
122 See Council of Europe Recommendation on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges No R (94) 
12, Principle V( l ): "judges have the duty to protect the rights and freedoms of all persons". 
123 Sir John Laws "Law and Democracy" [ 1995] PL 72, 85 . 
124 Sir Robin Cooke " Fundamentals" [ 1988] NZLJ 158, 164. 
125 Cooke, above, 165 ; See also Lord Hoffman "Separation of Powers" (COMBAR Lecture, 200 l) paras 
12-13 . 
126 See Ian Leigh "Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human Rights Act, and Strasbourg" 
[2002] PL 265 , 287 where the author notes there is nothing in the HRA saying the executive is sovereign; 
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One side argues that the court's judicial review power derives from the 
ultra vires doctrine and the supremacy of Parliament. 127 It is argued that it is the 
court's role to ensure the executive does not act outside the powers conferred 
upon them by Parliament. The court's role is limited to ensuring that the 
executive work within the four corners of the Act and not beyond. 
The other side argues that judicial review is a creation of the common 
law. 128 The courts acting in their wider constitutional role ensure that executive 
action does not contravene the rule of law, through judicially reviewing that 
action. It is up to the courts to develop the rules and principles that should 
govern judicial review. Executive action which jeopardises or contravenes these 
principles will be struck out. And if Parliament disagrees with any aspect of 
judicial review, they have the power to legislate in that area. The fact that they 
have not could be seen as a tacit acceptance of the courts' common law power 
to develop the judicial review doctrine. 
It is becoming increasingly accepted that the common law is the 
foundation of judicial review and not a power derived from Parliament' s 
sovereignty. Lord Steyn has commented that the overwhelming weight of 
reasoned argument has shown that the ultra vires argument is a dispensable 
See also the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which has a provision protecting the sovereignty of 
Parliament (section 4) but no provision protecting the executive. 
127 See generally Christopher Forsyth "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the 
Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review" in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 29; Mark Elliot "The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional 
Setting: Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law" in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and 
the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 83 ; Mark Elliot "The Demise of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying Judicial Review" ( 1999) 115 LQR I I 9 . 
128 See generally Paul Craig "Competing Models of Judicial Review" [ 1999) PL 428 ; Jeffrey Jowell "Of 
Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review" [ 1999) PL 448; Phillip A Joseph "The 
Demise of Ultra Vires - Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts" [200 I] PL 354; Jeffrey Jowell 
" Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" [2000) PL 671; Dawn Oliver "Is the 
Ultra Vires Rule the Basis for Judicial Review?" in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 3; Paul Craig " Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial 
Review [ 1998] CLJ 63 ; Gareth Wong "Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the Objections to 
Proportionality" [2000) PL 92 ; John Laws " Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction" in Michael Supperstone 
and James Goudie ( eds) Judicial Review (Butterworths, London, 1992) 51. 
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fiction. 129 However I still believe it is important to briefly discuss this long-
standing debate in order to gain a clear understanding of where the courts' 
power to judicially review executive action derives from, and what the qualities 
of that power are. The proper justification for judicial review not only matters 
because it provides a reason for judicial review, but also because it indicates the 
limits of judicial power and the scope of judicial review. 130 
If the justification for judicial review is the ultra vires doctrine, the courts 
will be more constrained in what they can and cannot do. They would need to 
justify the development of a new head of review under the ultra vires doctrine. 
Under the ultra vires doctrine the courts would need to justify a new head of 
review through the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. They would need to 
show that the new ground of review is necessary to stop the executive usurping 
their delegated authority, and ensure the executive act within the ambit of the 
parent Act. 
Whereas if the justification for judicial review comes from the common 
law the courts will have wider discretion as to how they conduct judicial review 
and how probing they are in their scrutiny of executive action. The common law 
theory of judicial review admits more room for judicial independence in shaping 
fundamental norms of executive behaviour. 131 They would need to justify a new 
head of review as necessary for the maintenance of the rule of law, and the 
maintenance of a free and democratic society. 
Thus it is fundamental to decide which approach is correct when 
considering the legitimacy of a new head of review such as proportionality. It is 
129 Lord Steyn " Democracy Through Law" (2002) 6 EHRLR 723 , 725 ; See also R v Secretary of State f or 
the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [ 1998] AC 539, 585-591 (HL) Lord Steyn, which points towards 
the rule of law justification. 
130 Jeffrey Jowell "Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review" [ 1999] PL 448, 
449. 
131 Gareth Wong "Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the Objections to Proportionality" 
[2000] PL 92, I 00. 
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my view that the foundation of judicial review is the common law, and I will 
briefly discuss why. 
Proponents of the ultra vires view believe to premise judicial review on 
anything other than the ultra vires doctrine would be to compromise the 
sovereignty of Parliament. 132 However, there is in my view nothing to 
substantiate this claim. The courts have developed judicial review as a common 
law body of rules, analogous to that of torts or contract. 133 There is nothing to 
suggest that the development of a common law doctrine infringes on 
Parliamentary sovereignty. 134 If Parliament disagrees with the development of 
such rules they are able to pass a statute abolishing those rules, and the courts 
would be forced to obey. Proponents of the ultra vires view also claim that to 
allow the courts unfettered power to develop judicial review is to advocate a 
supreme judiciary.135 However this must also be a false concern. The judiciary 
does not act unchecked, as every development in the common law can be 
overridden by Parliament. Thus the judiciary are not supreme. 
There is of course also the fact that all of the grounds of review except 
legality cannot be justified on the premise that the courts are acting as agents of 
Parliament. Irrationality and procedural impropriety cannot be justified on the 
ground that they exist so as to ensure executive power is exercised within the 
four corners of the parent Act. These two grounds are given life and nurtured by 
the courts and nowhere is it suggested that they are any less legitimate because 
132 Mark Elliot "The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of 
Administrative Law" in Christopher Forsyth ( ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2000) 83 , 86; See generally Christopher Forsyth "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales : The Ultra Vires 
Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review" in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review 
and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 29 . 
133 See Paul Craig "Competing Models of Judicial Review" [ 1999] PL 428, 434 for a fuller explanation. 
134 See Craig, above, 437 for a fuller explanation. 
135 Mark Elliot "The Ultra Vires Doctri11e in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of 
Administrative Law" in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2000) 83 , 86. 
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of the Jack of explicit legislative approval. 136 It could of course be argued that 
the courts are acting to protect legislative intent as Parliament could not have 
intended a discretionary power to be exercised irrationally or procedurally 
unfairly. And it has further been argued that Parliament has intentionally 
delegated authority to the judiciary to carry out evaluations of executive 
action. 137 However this reasoning is not only strained but also superficial. 
Jowell suggests that the ultra vires justification is artificial because it supplies 
an intention to the legislature which is wholly fictional; the legislature is 
unlikely ever to have considered the matter, and if it had, might well have 
formed a different conclusion from that implied by the courts. 138 This point can 
be supported by the case law in this area. 139 The fact that no judges feel it 
necessary to justify their review powers on the grounds of Parliamentary 
sovereignty is rather telling. 
Two other ancillary arguments can be made in favour of the common law view. 
Firstly, it has been argued that judicial review predates any concept of ultra 
vires, its rich lineage dating as far back as the Magna Carta and the splitting up 
of the Curia Regis into the executive, the legislature and judiciary. 140 It would 
thus be profound if a modern doctrine such as ultra vires could retrospectively 
be used to justify judicial review which many writers have propounded stretches 
back to the seventeenth century. 141 Secondly, it has been argued that ultra vires 
136 Gareth Wong "Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the Objections to Proportionality" 
[2000] PL 92, 99. 
137 Christopher Forsyth "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of 
Parliament and Judicial Review" in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 29, 41. 
138 Jeffrey Jowell "Of Vires and Vacuums : The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review" [ 1999] PL 448, 
449. 
139 See Paul Craig "Competing Models of Judicial Review" [ 1999] PL 428, 443 and Paul Craig " Ultra Vires 
and the Foundations of Judicial Review [ 1998] CLJ 63 , 79-85 for a fuller explanation. 
140 Phillip A Joseph "The Demise of Ultra Vires - Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts" [200 l] PL 
354, 363-365 . 
141 See for example Joseph, above, 367-368 . 
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cannot justify the fact that judicial review now stretches to non-statutory 
bodies. 142 
Thus, it is, in my view, clear that the ultra v1res doctrine is not the 
foundation of judicial review. The power of the judiciary to review the exercise 
of executive power derives from the common law and the courts' wider 
constitutional role to protect the rule of law. 143 The justification for review is 
rooted in deeper constitutional principle. 144 Joseph has commented that 
"[ w]here judicial power is inherent ... the courts must look beyond the formal 
constitution to the logically prior concept of the rule of law". 145 It is thus for the 
judiciary to decide upon the procedural and substantive principles of judicial 
review which should apply to executive action. It is for the judiciary to decide 
the level of scrutiny to be given to any one executive decision. The courts will 
impose standards that they believe to be in line with the rule of law and a 
democratic society. In their wider constitutional role, as discussed above they 
will protect society from the excesses of executive power. It is for the courts to 
decide the limits to be placed on executive action as they are the body entrusted 
with the task. If Parliament disagrees with this they can pass legislation to that 
effect. There can be no qualm with proportionality review on this level. 
Viewing judicial review in this way implies that it is not only legitimate 
but also natural that the judiciary will create new heads of review as the rule of 
law and justice require. New principles emerge by a process of accretion 
reflecting the constitution's changing imperatives and needs. 146 The proper role 
of judges requires that they be sensitive to the changing constitutional context in 
which they operate, and take note of developing principles of democratic 
142 See for example R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datajin pie [ 1987] QB 815; Jeffrey 
Jowell "Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review" [ 1999] PL 448, 459. 
143 Lord Woolf "Droit Public - English Style" [ 1995] PL 57, 68: "the Courts derive their power from the 
rule of law". 
144 Jowell, above, 455. 
14~ Phillip A Joseph "The Demise of Ultra Vires - Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts" [200 l] PL 
354, 358. 
146 Jowell, above, 455. 
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government and administration, of which proportionality is one. 147 Like other 
branches of common law, administrative law develops and changes according to 
current perceptions of what is required of the courts in their distinctive judicial 
function. 148 
E What I Am and Am Not Saying 
In this section I have advocated the proportionality head of review, and 
attempted to justify its adoption. In my view it infringes no more on the 
executive branch than do the grounds of irrationality and illegality review. 
Regardless of this comparison I have also attempted to justify the UK 
judiciary' s adoption of the doctrine on two other grounds. First, by considering 
the wider constitutional and supervisory role of the judiciary in the separation of 
powers. And secondly, by considering the foundation of judicial review. 
I have, though, gone further than simply advocating proportionality 
review. I have also through my discussion of the role of judges and the genesis 
of judicial review advocated a more active approach by the judiciary where 
human rights are at stake. I have advocated a judicial approach which should 
place the protection of human rights above deference to government. I have 
advocated this approach because I believe this is the appropriate course of 
action for the judiciary to take given their role in the separation of powers. If 
they do not anxiously protect human rights no person or entity will. The price 
that society pays for not protecting these rights is the degradation of the rule of 
law and the possibility of the arbitrary exercise of power. If the result of this is a 
limiting of the scope of executive power, then so be it. Compromising 
fundamental tenets of a free and democratic society is too high a price to pay 
simply to grant the executive some lee-way. 
147 Gareth Wong "Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the Objections to Proportionality" 
[2000] PL 92, I 00 . 
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In making these propositions I am not suggesting the judiciary wage war 
on the executive nor am I suggesting that the judiciary replace executive 
decisions with their own where they feel appropriate. 149 Such action would be to 
grossly compromise and undermine the separation of powers, the independence 
of the judiciary and the stability of society. 
What I am suggesting is that the judiciary do have a duty to uphold and 
protect fundamental rights so as to enhance the rule of law. The courts have a 
duty to prevent the executive infringing on those rights to an unacceptable 
level. 150 When the courts void an executive action for being disproportionate 
they are not infringing on the executive's sphere but simply fulfilling their own 
duty. 
V PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AND NEW ZEALAND 
In this section I suggest that proportionality review must be adopted in 
New Zealand in light of our international commitments and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("the NZBORA"). I consider the status of 
proportionality review in New Zealand. I highlight several positive steps that 
have been made in the area of judicial review, which point to the adoption of 
proportionality review in New Zealand soon. 
148 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd [ 1994] 2 NZLR 
64 I, 652 (CA) Cooke P. 
149 See Paul Craig "Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law" in Evelyn Ellis (ed) The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 85, 85-87: Craig makes it clear that 
proportionality review does not entail the judiciary substituting their decision for that of the primary 
decision-maker. 
150 See also Nicholas Blake "Importing Proportionality: Clarification or Confusion" (2002) I EI-IRLR 19, 
26: "Judicial review is not a lawyers' paradise but a constitutional safeguard against an active and intrusive 
executive". 
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A The International Dimension: The JCCPR 
It is important to view the possibility of proportionality review being 
adopted in New Zealand in light of our international obligations and duties. In 
my opinion New Zealand's international obligations, particularly under the 
ICCPR151 , the Convention against Torture ("the CAT") 152 and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child ("the CRC") 153, require proportionality review to be 
adopted in order to give fundamental rights the protection required by those 
treaties. 
1 No Incorporated Convention - Does It Matter? 
It is first important to note that there is no substance in the argument that 
non-incorporation of a Convention-type document into municipal law precludes 
the development of proportionality review in New Zealand. In Alconbury, Lord 
Slynn of Hadley states that the proportionality ground of review should be 
accepted as part of administrative law without reference to the HRA. 154 And in 
Daly, Lord Cooke of Thorndon echoed this proposition: 155 
(W]hile this case has arisen in a jurisdiction where the European Convention ... 
applies, and while the case is one in which the Convention and the common law 
produce the same result, it is of great importance, in my opinion, that the common 
law by itself is being recognised as a sufficient source of the fundamental right ... 
Thus the decision may prove to be in point in common law jurisdictions not 
affected by the Convention. Rights similar to those in the Convention are of course 
to be found in constitutional documents and other formal affirmations of rights 
151 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
152 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( I 0 
December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85 . 
153 Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989) 1577 UNTS 3. 
154 R (A /conbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(200 I] 2 WLR 1389, para 51 (HL) Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
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elsewhere. The truth is, I think, that some rights are inherent and fundamental to 
democratic civilised society. Conventions, constitutions, bills of rights and the like 
respond by recognising rather than creating them. 
Thus the fact that New Zealand does not have a Convention-type 
document should not stand in the way of the New Zealand courts developing 
proportionality as a separate head of review. It would also seem inequitable and 
out of step with international norms for the citizens of European countries to 
have their rights more anxiously protected from executive action than the 
citizens of New Zealand. 
2 New Zealand's International Obligations and the Proportionality 
Requirement 
Aside from these points though, New Zealand has ratified and is bound by 
the ICCPR. 156 New Zealand has also ratified the first optional protocol to the 
ICCPR allowing individuals the right of petition to the Human Rights 
Committee ("the HRC"). 157 The ICCPR is further strengthened in New Zealand 
municipal law by its express inclusion in the NZBORA long title. 158 The ICCPR 
and European Convention are largely identical in nature, content and purpose.
159 
Both treaties, broadly speaking, seek to protect the individual from arbitrary 
State action by protecting the most fundamental of civil and political rights. 160 
The rights protected in both are very similar. 161 One particular aspect which 
155 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [200 I] 2 AC 115, para 30 (HL) Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon. 
156 Date of ratification: 28 December 1978. 
157 Date of accession: 26 May 1989. 
158 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990, Long Title reads: "An Act - ... (b) To affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". 
159 This point has been acknowledged by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Lange v Atkinson [ 1998) 3 
NZLR 424, 457 (CA) Blanchard J (Richardson P, Henry J, Keith J concurring). 
160 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, preamble; 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 
213 UNTS 221, preamble. 
161 For example compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171 , art 2(3) to European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms ( 4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 221, art 13 (right to an effective remedy); compare ICCPR, 
above, art 17 to European Convention, above, art 8 (right to respect for private and family life); compare 
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characterises both treaties 1s the limitation clauses on certain individual 
rights. 162 Both the ICCPR and the European Convention provide that rights can 
be infringed upon in certain circumstances - most typically where the 
infringement on the individual's right is balanced against a wider objective 
( often the public benefit). Where an infringement does not fulfil this test (i.e. is 
disproportionate) the right will have been violated by the State and the 
international obligation breached. 
It is pertinent to note that many of the HRC general comments regarding 
limitation clauses expressly outline that any limitation placed upon a right must 
fulfil the European style proportionality test. For example the general comment 
regarding the right to freedom of movement (Article 12) requires: 163 
[R]estrictive measures [to] conform [with] the principle of proportionality; they 
must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least 
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and 
they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected ... The principle of 
proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions, 
but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law. 
One difference, though, does exist between the HRC and ECHR analysis 
of limitation clauses, which is the approach of each body to the "margin of 
appreciation". While the ECHR adheres to the doctrine, the HRC does not. The 
Committee has expressly rejected the doctrine 164, meaning that New Zealand is 
ICCPR, above, art 14 to European Convention, above, art 6 (fair trial rights) ; compare ICCPR, above, art 9 
to European Convention, above, art 5 (habeas corpus). 
162 See Tavita v Minister of immigration [ I 994) 2 NZLR 257, 262-265 (CA) Cooke P for the Court: the 
Court of Appeal used ECHRjurisprudence regarding limitation clauses to clarify the requirements of New 
Zealand's international law obligations where rights were to be infringed upon. 
163 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27 on Article 12 (freedom of movement), UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/ I/ Rev5 (1999) para 14-15 (emphasis added). 
164 Human Rights Committee Communication No: 511 / 1992: Lansman v Finland, 8 November 1994, 
CCPR/C/52/0 /511/1992 para 9.4: "A State may understandably wish to encourage development or allow 
economic activity by enterprises . The scope of its freedom to do so is not to be assessed by reference to a 
margin of appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken in article 27". The Committee 
has affirmed this position in the New Zealand context: Human Rights Committee Communication No 
547/1993: Mahuika v New Zealand, 15 November 2000, CCPR/C/70/0/547/1993 para 9.4; The State party 
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subject to much closer scrutiny under the ICCPR than the UK is under the 
European Convention. 
Thus, just as the UK judiciary were required to adopt proportionality 
review because of their obligations under the European Convention, so too must 
the New Zealand judiciary because of their obligations and duties under the 
ICCPR. To fail in this obligation would be to breach international law. Thus 
where an executive interference purports to disproportionately infringe upon a 
citizen's right, the courts must remedy and safeguard against such an 
infringement. 
3 Have the Judiciary Been Receptive? 
The New Zealand courts have shown they are willing to consider 
international obligations in judicial review proceedings. 165 In Tavita v Minister 
of Immigration the Court of Appeal were asked to decide whether the Minister 
of Immigration should have regard to the international treaty obligations (under 
the ICCPR and the CRC) concerning the child and the family in considering 
whether to enforce a removal order. 166 The Court relied heavily upon the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR, and in particular the European Court ' s 
proportionality approach where a right was to limited. 167 The Court of Appeal 
found that a European style balancing exercise is required at times, and that a 
broadly similar exercise may be required under New Zealand's international 
has argued for a margin of appreciation to be applied to no avail in several other communications: 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Communication No. 17/ 1999: BJ v Denmark, I 0 
May 2000, CERD/C/56/D/ 17/ 1999; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
Communication No. 26/2002: Hagan v Australia, 14 April 2003, CERD/C/62/D/26/2002; Committee 
Against Torture Communication No 65/ 1997: !AO v Sweden, 6 May 1998, CAT/C/20/D/65/ 1997. 
165 Ashby v Minister of Immigration [ 1981] I NZLR 222 (CA); Puli 'uvea v Removal Review Authority 
( 1996) 2 HRNZ 510 (HC); Patel v Minister of Immigration [ 1997] I NZLR 252 (HC); Patel v Chief 
Executive of the Department of labour [ 1997] I NZLR I 02 (HC); Rajan v Minister of Immigration [ 1996] 
3 NZLR 543 (CA); New Zealand Airline Pilots· Association Inc v Attorney-General [ 1997] 3 NZLR 269 
(CA). 
166 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [ 1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA). 
167 Tavita v Minister of Immigration, above, 262-265 Cooke P for the Court. 
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instruments. 168 The Court found the argument that the Minister is entitled to 
ignore international treaties to be "an unattractive" one, as this would imply 
New Zealand's international obligations were merely window-dressing. 169 The 
Court held that some international obligations and duties were so manifestly 
important that no Minister could fail to take them into account. 17° Further, the 
fact that recourse was available to the HRC meant that the courts would be open 
to scrutiny if they were to hold the exercise of statutory discretions to be 
unfettered by international instruments. 171 
The unanimous decision in Tavita and its progeny signal a positive step in 
the judiciary's realisation of their role in ensurmg compliance with New 
Zealand's international obligations. The decision also demonstrated a 
willingness to adopt a European balancing-type test in light of the requirements 
of international instruments, which was further than the UK courts had got at 
the time. 172 And in Lange v Atkinson the Court of Appeal believed recourse to 
decisions interpreting the ICCPR and European Covenant were of direct 
relevance. 173 This growing commitment to international obligations was echoed 
in Patel v Minister of Immigration where Baragwanath J stated that the Minister 
had to take account of all circumstances, including New Zealand's international 
obligations when exercising a discretion.174 
Thus there are signs that the New Zealand judiciary is embarking upon a 
realisation of its international obligations. Several cases have drawn on the 
European style proportionality test, given the similarity of the Convention with 
the ICCPR. The fact that the judiciary have expressly acknowledged the 
168 Tavita v Minister of Immigration, above, 265 Cooke P for the Court . 
169 Tavita v Minister of Immigration, above, 266 Cooke P for the Court. 
170 Tavita v Minister of immigration, above, 266 Cooke P for the Court. 
17 1 Tavita v Minister of Immigration , above, 266 Cooke P for the Court. 
172 The law in the UK at the time was Brind v Secretary of State f or the Home Department [ 1991] I All ER 
720 (HL) in which the House of Lords had expressly rejected proportionality review. 
173 Lange v Atkinson [I 998] 3 NZLR 424, 457-459, 465-467 (CA) Blanchard J (Richardson P, Henry J, 
Keith J concurring). 
174 Patel v Minister of Immigration [ 1997] I NZLR 252, 256 (HC) Baragwanath J; See also Patel v Chief 
Executive of the Department of Labour [1997] I NZLR 102, 110 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
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,. 
importance and relevance of the proportionality test in light of international 
requirements provides even greater impetus for the adoption of proportionality 
review. The judiciary should now openly adopt proportionality as a stand alone 
head of review, to ensure compliance with New Zealand's international treaty 
obligations. 
4 International Human Rights Law and Effective Remedies 
The remedial aspect of judicial review 1s equally important in New 
Zealand 175 as under the European Convention 176, particularly in light of New 
Zealand's ICCPR commitment and the Court of Appeal's landmark decision in 
Baigent 's Case. 177 The fact that the ECHR has found that the traditional grounds 
of review are inadequate to provide an effective remedy should send a signal to 
the New Zealand jurisdiction that the time has come to adopt proportionality as 
h d f · 178 a separate ea o review. 
New Zealand, like the UK, is also under an international commitment to 
provide effective remedies. Under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR New Zealand is 
under a commitment to provide an effective remedy to any person whose rights 
or freedoms are violated. The UK carries the same obligation under Article 13 
of the Convention. 179 Given the fact that the NZBORA is an Act "to affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights" 180 this imposes an obligation on the courts to provide effective remedies 
where rights have been breached. Indeed, in Baigent 's Case the majority held 
that the NZBORA should not be viewed in a vacuum and that the ICCPR is 
175 It has been affirmed by the New Zealand courts that judicial review is a type of remedy. See for 
example: R v Goodwin [ 1993] 2 NZLR 153, 191-192 (CA) Richardson J; Bennett v Superintendent, 
Rimutaka Prison [2002] I NZLR 616 (CA). It is also a deeply rooted principle of the law that where there 
is a right there is a remedy: Ashby v White ( 1703) 2 Ld Raym 938, 953-954 Holt CJ. 
176 See Part II A 4 Article I 3. 
177 Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case] [ 1994) 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
178 See Part II A 4 Article 13. 
179 See Part II A 4 Article 13. 
180 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Long Title. 
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brought in through the long title. 181 Both President Cooke, as he then was, and 
Hardie Boys J held that the courts had a duty to provide an effective remedy.
182 
Thus, the New Zealand courts are under an obligation to provide effective 
remedies for violations of fundamental rights and freedoms. The fact that the 
ECHR has found that the traditional grounds of judicial review cannot provide 
such vindication for rights breaches 183 should send a clear signal that New 
Zealand must adopt proportionality as a separate head of review. This argument 
is further strengthened by the fact that Article 13 ( of the Convention) and 
Article 2(3) (of the ICCPR) are carbon copies of one another. To ignore this 
signal would be to allow rights violations to go without effective vindication, 
and for the New Zealand judiciary to breach their international obligations. 
B The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
I Long Title -A Positive Guarantee 
In New Zealand I believe proportionality review is both mandated and 
required by the NZBORA. 
The NZBORA long title reads: 
An Act-
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in New Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
181 Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case} [ 1994] 3 NZLR 667, 676 (CA) Cooke P; Baigent 's Case, 
above, 691 Casey J; Baigent's Case, above, 699-700 Hardie Boys J; Baigent 's Case above, 717-718 
McKay J. 
182 Bai gent 's Case, above, 676 Cooke P; Baigent 's Case, above, 699-703 Hardie Boys J. 
183 See Part II A 4 Article I 3. 
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This long title imparts a positive obligation on the judiciary, not simply to 
observe rights, but to "affirm, protect and promote" them. 
184 The NZBORA 
long title impresses a duty to actively protect fundamental rights, affirming the 
judiciary' s wider constitutional role in a free and democratic society. This is of 
course enhanced by the inclusion of the ICCPR in the long title. 
185 This means 
there exists a statutory obligation on the judiciary to protect individual ' s rights 
against executive action which attempts to infringe upon those rights. And thus 
it would not only be legitimate but required that the New Zealand courts adopt 
proportionality as a separate head of review as it aids in the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 186 
2 Sections 3 and 5 - The Judiciary 's Obligations 
The above NZBORA argument is strengthened even further in relation to 
the rights listed in the Act by sections 3 and 5. It is my view that when read 
together, these sections impose a duty on the judiciary to adopt proportionality 
review when NZBORA rights are at stake. Section 3 of the Act ordains that the 
NZBORA applies to acts done by all three branches of government, including 
the judiciary. President Cooke, as he then was, affirmed this in Baigent 's Case : 
"Section 3 . . . makes it clear that the Bill of Rights applies to acts done by the 
Courts. The Act is binding on us, and we would fail in our duty if we did not 
give an effective remedy to a person whose legislatively affirmed rights have 
b · f · d" 187 een 1.11 nnge . 
184 See R v Goodwin [I 993) 2 NZLR 153, 191-192, 193-194 (CA) Richardson J: ""affirm", "protect" and 
"promote" are all words expressive of a positive commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
185 Baigent 's Case, above, 699 Hardie Boys J: " I would be most reluctant to conclude that the [New 
Zealand Bill of Rights] Act, which purports to affirm this commitment [to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights] , should be construed other than in a manner that gives effect to it". 
186 R (Daly) v Secretary of State f or the Home Department [200 I] 2 AC I 15 , para 27 (HL) Lord Steyn : " the 
intensity of review is somewhat greater under the proportionality approach". 
187 Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case} [ 1994) 3 NZLR 667, 676 (CA) Cooke P. 
46 
Section 5 of the Act reads: 
Justified limitations - Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights [which preserves 
the sovereignty of Parliament], the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Section 5 signals that the rights in the NZBORA are not absolute but may 
be subject to justified limitations. 188 In Ministry of Transport v Noort 
Richardson J highlighted the international genesis of section 5, being derived 
from the Canadian Charter, the ICCPR and interestingly the European 
Convention. 189 Richardson J also found the section 5 test to be analogous to 
international concepts of proportionality. 190 
In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, Tipping J, in 
delivering the judgment of the Court, outlined the current approach to be taken 
to a section 5 inquiry concerning a statute: 191 
(1) The objective of the legislature in enacting the prov1s10n m question 
should be identified as well as the importance and significance of that objective; 
(2) There should be proportionality between the importance of the objective 
and the way the legislature has sought to achieve it - "a sledge hammer should 
not be used to crack a nut"; 
(3) The means used must have a rational relationship to the objective; 
(4) In achieving the objective there should be as little interference as possible 
with the affected right or freedom; 
188 This point is affirmed in Alwen industries Ltd v Collector of Customs [ 1996] 3 NZLR 226, 229 (HC) 
Robertson J. 
189 Ministry of Transport v Noort [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) Richardson J. 
190 Ministry a/Transport v Noort, above, 283 Richardson J. 
191 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA) Tipping J for the Court; 
It should be noted that although Tipping J is outlining this test in the context of legislation, there is no 
reason why the same test should not also apply to executive action. In Police v Beggs [ 1999] 3 NZLR 615 
(HC) the High Court found that any limit imposed upon a right in the exercise of a public power had to 
fulfil the section 5 test. 
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(5) The section 5 inquiry involves a value judgement by the court "on behalf 
of the society which it serves and after considering all the issues which may 
have a bearing on the individual case, whether they are social, legal, moral, 
economic, administrative, ethical or otherwise". 
It is apparent that this test bears remarkable resemblance to the European 
proportionality test. The third limb of the Moonen test is analogous to the 
suitability limb of the proportionality test, while the fourth limb is very similar 
to the necessity limb of the proportionality test. It is also apparent that the 
second limb of the Moonen test is identical to the proportionality limb of the 
European test. It is further important to note the fifth limb in Tipping J's 
Moonen inquiry. Tipping J states that courts will make a value judgement even 
if the case involves social or economic issues. 
192 This contrasts with the UK 
application of the proportionality test where great deference has been shown in 
these policy-type areas. 193 
Thus it can be concluded that section 5 provides for a test virtually 
identical to the ECHR proportionality test where rights are infringed upon.
194 
Because the NZBORA applies to acts of the judiciary (by virtue of section 3), 
the courts must utilise the section 5 test in any case where a NZBORA right is 
being infringed, to ensure that the infringement is a proportionate one. Just as 
the English courts apply the proportionality test where HRA (Convention) rights 
are at issue in judicial review proceedings, so too must the New Zealand courts 
apply the section 5 test where NZBORA rights are at stake. 
192 See also Sir Ivor Richardson "Rights Jurisprudence - Justice for All?" in Phillip A Joseph (ed) Essays 
on the Constitution (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) 61, 82 in relation to section 5: "[T]he Court undertakes 
an extensive empirical examination supported by economic, statistical, and sociological data, makes a cost-
benefit analysis of the effects of various policy choices and chooses the solution which best reflects a 
balancing of the values involved"; Compare this to the French style "bilan-coGt-avantages" (cost benefit-
analysis): See Nicholas Emiliou The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study 
(Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) 67-114. 
193 See Part III Proportionality Review and the UK. 
194 In Lange v Atkinson [ 1998] 3 NZLR 424, 466 (CA) Blanchard J (Richardson P, Henry J, Keith J 
concurring) the Court noted the value of decisions made under the European Convention in their analysis of 
section 5. 
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The net result of reading sections 3 and 5 together is that the section 5 
proportionality test must be available in judicial review of executive action. 
Therefore if an executive decision or action represents an unjustifiable 
limitation on a right it must be voided. The New Zealand courts may not be able 
to strike down incompatible legislation
195 but there is nothing in the Act 
preventing the voiding of inconsistent executive action. 
3 Section 27(2) - The "Rights-Enhancing" Effect 
It is lastly important to note the rights-enhancing nature of section 27(2). 
Section 27(2) of the Act provides that every person whose rights, obligations or 
interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by the determination 
of a tribunal or public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, 
for judicial review of that determination. Thus section 27 affirms the right to 
judicial review where an individual ' s rights are affected by the determinations 
of a public authority. Section 27, though, does more than simply affirm the right 
to judicial review. The NZBORA places positive obligations upon the courts, 
which the common law does not. 196 The NZBORA has been acknowledged as 
having a rights-enhancing effect 1
97, which is consistent with overseas 
jurisprudence. 198 Rather than simply affirming the common law position the 
NZBORA enhances the scope and strength of rights. The inclusion of section 
27(2) thus elevates judicial review above other common law rights, making it a 
fundamental right. The inclusion of section 27(2) serves to heighten the scope 
and intensity of review. This enhancing effect would be consistent with the 
adoption of a more intensive ground of review such as proportionality which 
would serve to further protect and promote rights. 
195 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4 . 
196 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Long Titl e; Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case} [ 1994] 
3 NZLR 667, 676 (CA) Cooke P; R v Goodwin [1993) 2 NZLR 153, 191-192, 193-194 (CA) Richardson J. 
197 R v Goodwin [ 1993] 2 NZLR 153 , I 93-194 (CA) Richardson J ; Ministry of Transport v Noort [ I 992] 3 
NZLR 260, 270 (CA) Cooke P. 
198 For example Re Howard and Presiding Officer of Inmate Discip!ina,y Court of Stony Mountain 
Institution ( 1985) I 9 CCC (3d) I 95 , 231 (FCA) MacGuigan J. 
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C The New Zealand State of Affairs 
Proportionality has not yet been accepted by the New Zealand courts as a 
stand alone head of judicial review, contrary to international obligations and the 
NZBORA. There is however a clear trend in the case law pointing towards the 
adoption of proportionality review. Indeed it seems inevitable that the day will 
soon come when proportionality does represent a stand alone head of review in 
New Zealand. 
In the pre-NZBORA decision of Isaac v Minster of Consumer Affairs 
Tipping J expressly rejected proportionality as a stand alone ground of 
review. 199 Tipping J considered the principle of proportionality to be no more 
than a criterion upon which the courts could consider whether a decision was 
unreasonable or not. 200 Thus Tipping J did recognise the principle in New 
Zealand law, but merely as a principle to be taken into account when assessing 
the reasonableness of an executive action. 
Proportionality was next considered by Thomas J in Waitakere City 
Council v Lovelock.20 ' Thomas J emphasised the fact that the standard of 
unreasonableness will vary depending on the subject-matter.
202 He observed that 
a more rigorous examination of the executive decision may be warranted where 
fundamental rights are at stake.
203 He also commented that this more exacting 
standard would also be expected where the executive decision bears on a 
fundamental constitutional document.
204 In Thames Valley Electric Power 
Board v NZFP Pulp and Paper Cooke P made comments of a similar nature: 
" [a]t times it becomes necessary to give especial weight to human and civil 
199 Isaac v Minister of Consumer Affairs [ 1990] 2 NZLR 606, 635-636 (HC) Tipping J. 
200 Isaac v Minister of Consumer Affairs, above, 636 Tipping J. 
20 1 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [ 1997] 2 NZLR 385 (CA). 
202 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 403 , 411 Thomas J. 
203 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 403 , 411 Thomas J. 
204 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 403 Thomas J. 
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rights, including class or group rights", perhaps signalling a greater level of 
scrutiny where rights are involved.
205 
Regarding proportionality, Thomas J saw it as uncertain whether it would 
evolve as a separate ground of review.
206 He thought there to be a close affinity 
between the concept of proportionality and reasonableness.
207 Thomas J thought 
it to be impossible to divorce the concept of proportionality from that of 
reasonableness and believed there to be no problem with treating proportionality 
as an aspect of unreasonableness. 
208 Thus while leaving the possible 
development of a separate head of proportionality review open Thomas J did 
signal that the principle of proportionality should, at least, form part of the 
reasonableness ground of review. 
The most recent judicial comment on proportionality came in Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan.
209 Keith J delivered the 
judgment of the Court and in a carefully worded discussion chose to leave open 
the question whether proportionality should represent a separate ground of 
review in New Zealand.2 10 
It appears that proportionality will soon represent a separate and discrete 
head of review in New Zealand. The fact that Keith J did not expressly dismiss 
the idea as Tipping J had 12 years earlier does represent a change in judicial 
attitude. This shows the judiciary is gradually warming to the idea, in an 
environment where the courts are becoming more aware of the implications of 
their international obligations. This is echoed in the fact that the judiciary has 
205 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd [ 1994] 2 NZL
R 
641, 653 (CA) Cooke P. See also Benne/! v Superinlendent, Rimutaka Prison [2002] I NZLR 616, para
 65 
(CA) Blanchard J for the Court: "In cases involving human rights the events which are impugned 
will be 
closely scrutinised". 
206 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 407 Thomas J. 
207 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 407 Thomas J. 
208 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 408 Thomas J. 
209 institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan [2003] I NZLR 154 (CA). 
210 Institute of Chartered Accounlants of New Zealand v Bevan, above, para 55 Keith J for the Court. 
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said that greater scrutiny is required where issues are raised regarding human 
rights or constitutional documents. 
D New Zealand and Merits Review: Positive Signs 
The New Zealand judiciary has traditionally been unwilling to conduct 
merits review, preferring to focus on the procedure by which an executive 
decision is made and show deference to the executive decision-maker.2
11 
However the courts have also shown a willingness to consider new strands of 
review which verge upon merits review. Joseph has noted several developing 
grounds ofreview, which "embrace substantive review simpliciter".212 
The Court of Appeal in Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP 
Pulp and Paper Ltd tentatively affirmed substantive unfairness as a stand alone 
ground ofreview in New Zealand, intimating that the judiciary could look to the 
substantive fairness of a decision.213 Cooke P held that "[i]nevitably this means, 
whatever the verbal formula of review adopted, that the quality of an 
administrative decision as well as the procedure is open to a degree of 
review"214 , but stopped short of saying a judge could substitute his or her own 
decision for that of the executive's.215 
211 See for example Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd v Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd [ 1997] I 
NZLR 650, 656 (CA) Richardson P; Ports of Auckland Ltd v Auckland City Council [ 1999] 1 NZLR 60 I, 
606 (HC) Baragwanath J; Northern Roller Milling Co v Commerce Commission [ 1994] 2 NZLR 747, 750 
(HC) Gallen J; Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd 
[ 1994] 2 NZLR 641, 654 (CA) Fisher J; Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) 
[ 1996] 2 NZLR 537, 545-546 (CA) Richardson P; CREEDNZ Jnc v Governor-General [ 1981] I NZLR 
172, 197-198 (CA) Richardson J; Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [ 1997] 2 NZLR 385, 397 (CA) 
Richardson P. 
212 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2 ed , Brookers, Wellington, 
2001) para 20.3.4. 
213 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd [ 1994] 2 NZLR 
641, 652 (CA) Cooke P (MacKay J, fisher J concurring). 
214 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd, above, 652 
Cooke P. 
2 15 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd, above, 653 
Cooke P. 
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In Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour Baragwanath J 
found consistency of decision-making to be a head of review.2 16 Thus one 
person cannot be treated differently from another where their circumstances are 
indistinguishable.2 17 Baragwanath J believed consistency of decision-making to 
be a constitutional principle required by the rule of law.2 18 This type of review 
also verges on merits review as it necessarily involves the judge considering the 
substance of the decision and scrutinising it for consistency. In a broader sense 
this would mean the judge would overrule the executive ' s decision if it were 
found to be inconsistent, and replace it with a consistent one. 
Joseph concurs that both substantive unfairness and consistency of 
decision making represent a shift towards merits review.2 19 He also points to 
two other developing heads of review. 220 The first is the " innominate ground" as 
developed by Lord Donaldson MR in R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex 
parte Guinness plc. 22 1 The Master of the Rolls asked simply: "whether 
something had gone wrong of a nature and degree which required the 
. . f h C " 222 I mtervent1on o t e ourt . n ew Zealand this ground was affirmed in 
Seataste Products Ltd v Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries, where 
Gallen J also noted that the heads of review were not limited to the existing 
ones.223 The second developing head that Joseph notes is "constitutional 
review". 224 He believes "constitutional review" to be a "values-driven" form of 
review, aimed at upholding fundamental constitutional standards, based on the 
Treaty of Waitangi , international obligations, and the NZBORA.225 
2 16 Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour [ 1997) I NZLR I 02 (HC). 
2 17 Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of l abour, above, 111 Baragwanath J. 
2 18 Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of l abour, above, 110-11 I Baragwanath J. 
2 19 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative l aw in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington , 
200l)para20.3.4. 
220 Joseph , above, para 20.3.4. 
22 1 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness pie [ I 990) I QB 146 (CA). 
222 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness pie, above, 160 Lord Donaldson MR. 
223 Seatasre Products Ltd v Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries [ 1995] 2 NZLR 449, 461 (HC) 
Gallen J. 
224 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative l aw in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2001) para 20 .3.4. 
225 Joseph , above, para 20.3 .4. 
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Thus the dicta of the courts in Thames Valley and Patel, as well as the two 
developing heads of review highlighted by Joseph, show the willingness of the 
judiciary to openly consider the substance of an executive decision. In light of 
this gradual shift in judicial attitude it would not be too far a step for the New 
Zealand courts to adopt proportionality review. Proportionality review would 
represent no greater a step towards merits review than the traditional heads,226 
let alone these other developing heads. 
E Proportionality Review and the Rule of Law 
While the debate between the ultra vires justification and the common law 
justification continues in the UK, the New Zealand courts have settled the 
issue.227 In New Zealand the courts have grounded judicial review upon the 
common law and the rule of Jaw. 
In the landmark decision of Peters v Davison the Court of Appeal 
grounded judicial review on the common law and the rule of law. 228 The 
majority held that the High Court ' s judicial review powers "are based on the 
central constitutional role of the Court to rule on questions of law", the essential 
purpose of judicial review being to "ensure that public bodies comply with the 
law". 229 The majority couched the error of law ground of review in the common 
law, and not in the ultra vires doctrine: "Error of Jaw is a ground of review in 
and of itself; it is not necessary to show that the error was one that caused the 
226 See Part IV B Proportionality- No More Substantive Review than the Traditional Heads of Review: 
Above it has been argued that the traditional heads of review themselves involve merits review. 
227 See Part IV D Judicial Review: A Common Law Right for a fuller discussion on the "ultra vires versus 
common law" debate. 
228 Peters v Davison [ 1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA). See also Phillip A Joseph "The Demise of Ultra Vires -
Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts" [200 l] PL 354; Philip A Joseph "The Shifting Terrain of 
Judicial Review" [ 1999] NZLJ 278 . 
229 Peters v Davison, above, 188 Richardson P, Henry J, Keith J. 
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tribunal or Court to go beyond its jurisdiction".230 The power of judicial review 
thus derives from the courts' constitutional role of upholding the rule of law.231 
Thus the judiciary's mandate in judicial review proceedings is given to 
them by the rule of law. The common law justification casts the judiciary in a 
wider constitutional role - ensuring that the executive does not encroach upon 
the rule of law. The Court of Appeal ' s contemplation of judicial review would 
require that new heads of review be developed as both the rule of law and 
justice require. Given this foundation of judicial review it would not be difficult 
for the New Zealand courts to justify the adoption of proportionality as a new 
head of review, given that it affords greater protection to fundamental rights and 
thus aids in the protection of the rule of law. 
VI CONCLUSION 
I have contended that proportionality review is a legitimate separate and 
discrete head of review. First, it cannot be said to represent a greater 
infringement upon the executive sphere than the traditional heads of review. 
Secondly, the adoption of proportionality review is mandated by the judiciary's 
constitutional role as the bulwark of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 232 
Thirdly, judicial review is a common law doctrine designed to scrutinise 
executive action for consistency with the rule of law. As such it is only natural 
that new heads of review such as proportionality will be required so as to 
adequately protect and promote individual rights in the face of executive 
interference. 
230 Peters v Davison, above, 18 l Richardson P, Henry J, Keith J. 
23 1 See also Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour [ 1997] l NZLR l 02, l l 0- l l l (HC) 
Baragwanath J . 
23 2 American President James Madison described the Supreme Court ' s power to judicially review 
legislation as an " impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power": Speech of 8 June 1789, l 
Annals of Congress 457. 
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The crux of my argument, though, has centred on the fact that 
proportionality review is mandated and required by international treaty 
obligations. The ICCPR and the European Convention (among others) both 
require that any interference with an individual's right be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. If the judiciary allows disproportionate executive action 
to go unchecked the judiciary is failing in its duties and obligations under 
international law. 
Steps have been made over the last decade in both the UK and New 
Zealand towards establishing proportionality review, largely because of 
international obligations under the European Convention and the ICCPR 
respectively. However both jurisdictions, in my view, continue to fall short of 
adequately protecting and promoting fundamental rights and freedoms from 
executive interference. The UK courts have adopted proportionality review 
because of the domestic incorporation of the Convention; however they still 
continue to apportion great weight to the decision of the primary decision-maker 
via the doctrine of deference. While, in New Zealand the courts remain 
woefully behind the times, not even having adopted proportionality review. 
It is my view that the UK courts are wrong to apply the doctrine of due 
deference when exercising proportionality review where human rights are at 
stake. The application of deference serves to weaken the intensity of review 
under the proportionality head. Instead of exposing the executive action to the 
most anxious of scrutiny some judges appear to tip-toe around the executive. 
Such an approach does not afford human rights the protection required in a free, 
open and democratic society. In propounding that deference is a spurious 
doctrine in the area of human rights I am not suggesting the judiciary wage war 
on the executive nor am I suggesting that the judiciary replace executive 
decisions with their own. I an1 simply contending that it is the courts' role to 
uphold human rights, and in discharging that role there is no need to defer to the 
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executive where human rights are at stake. To do otherwise, is to emasculate the 
very rights which the courts are duty-bound to affirm, protect and promote. 
I have also advocated that the New Zealand courts must adopt 
proportionality review. It is required by y ternational obligations, especially 
under the ICCPR. Proportionality review is also statutorily mandated by the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. By not adopting proportionality review 
the New Zealand courts are failing to afford adequate protection to fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The courts are failing in their international, statutory and 
constitutional obligations. 
Over 2,500 years ago Confucius realised the importance of 
proportionality. It is an enduring and pervasive concept which ought to shape 
the future development of administrative law in Commonwealth jurisdictions.
233 
It should be recognised as a governing concept in the relationship between the 
judiciary, the executive and human rights. 
233 " Laws thus proportionate and mild should never be dispensed with" (emphasis added) Thomas 
Jefferson , Letter to Edmond Pende lton, 26 August 1776, in Julian P Boyd (ed) Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
(1950) 1:505 . 
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